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NOTES AND LEGISLATION
The Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect at or After Death
Although § 81I (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides for
inclusion in a decedent's gross estate of property to the extent of any in-
terest of which he has made a transfer at any time "intended to take effect
in possession or enjoyment at or after his death," 1 includes any type of
transfer, its greatest utility has been in attacking the inter vivos trust, a
device which is particularly adaptable to a scheme of tax avoidance.2 Gen-
erally the trust will provide for an interest in the income of the trust res
for the life of the beneficiary or for a term of years, or for the life of one
other than the beneficiary. This interest is of very little importance for
the purpose of the estate tax unless the beneficiary is the settlor of the
trust.3 The remainders to persons other than the settlor which follow
this interest have been the focal point of the storm which has raged around
§ 811 (c) since it appeared in the first Federal Estate Act.
The remainders created by the trust may take many forms.4 But
regardless of the form which they assume they all give to the recipient
something which under the modern law he may transfer to another either
by a conveyance inter vivos or by will if the interest is not one which
terminates upon his death. To this extent the person in whom a re-
mainder is created by the inter vivos trust gets something more than a
devisee under a will. Yet until the interest preceding that of the remainder-
man ceases he does not have complete dominion over the res. He can not
receive the income from the res; if the res is in the form of shares of
stock, he cannot exercise any of the incidents of shareholdership; if the
res is in the form of real property, he is not entitled to physical possession
of that property; any sale of his interest will not bring him a return equal
to the full value of that part of the res to which his interest attaches. Thus
many of the attributes of ownership are withheld from him until the in-
terest preceding his terminates. It is the ripening of these latter advan-
tages at or after the death of the decedent-settlor which the statute has
fixed as the test of taxability and not those benefits which accrue at the
moment the trust comes into existence.5 The results of the early cases
i. This provision was contained in the first Federal Estate Tax, § 202 (b) of the
Revenue Act of I916, 39 STAT. 777. It has remained relatively unchanged though the
rest of § 2:2 (b) has experienced accretions and depletions.
2. See Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of Federal Income
and Estate Taxes (193o) 15 Coax. L. Q. 287, and PAul, STUDIEs IN FEaRAL TAXA-
Tor (1937) 42-66.
3. The Treasury has consistently adhered to the position that the value of the out-
standing estate for years or for life which is held by one other than the settlor must
be subtracted from the value of the trust corpus at the death of settlor, U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, § 81.17, as amended by T. D. 5512 of May 1, 1946. But see I PAUL, FaDRA.L
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (1942) §§ 7.24-7.29, wherein it is pointed out that this
policy may be a concession to the taxpayer. To date the Supreme Court has not been
asked to pass upon this question. Where the estate for years or for life is retained by
the settlor, the tax consequences may be serious. See text supported by notes 7-20
infra.
4. Since Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. io6 (i94o), the form of the remainder is
not significant for tax purposes; that case swept aside these "subtle casuistries" which
"derive from medieval concepts as to the necessity of a continuous seisin." 309 U. S.
at i18.
5. The expression "taking effect in possession or enjoyment" is usually understood
to refer to the "falling in" of the remainders rather than to their creation.
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show a lack of appreciation of this meaning of the phrase "taking effect
in possession or enjoyment" and the language of the most recent cases
indicates that the earlier errors have not been completely corrected.6
In view of this, the present status of § 81I (c) and predictions of its
possible outer limits can best be obtained by an examination of the various
factual situations which have come before the courts. A classification of'
the cases based upon the type of trusts involved reveals that all is not
chaos as far as the actual results achieved are concerned, despite the con-
fusion which may have been caused by the language which has been used
to explain these results.
Reservation of a Life Estate in the Settlor
In May v. Heiner7 a wife had transferred securities in trust to pay
the income for life to her husband, then to herself for life, and after her
death to distribute the corpus of the trust equally among her four chil-
dren. The wife died before the husband, and the Court held that no part
of the trust was includible in the wife's gross estate because no "interest"
passed from her to the living since "title" to the property has been fixed
by the trust deed.8 The government tried again the following year; but in
three per curiarn opinions the Court stood fast by May v. Heiner.,
The damage done by these decisions was hastily remedied by the
passage of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931 10 which specifically pro-
vided for the taxation of this type of trust. But in Hassett v. Welch".
the Court held that Congress intended the Joint Resolution to apply only
to those trusts created after its passage. However, it is unlikely that a
trust of this type, created before 1931, will escape taxation under the
aegis of May v. Heiner. The Court's theory of an estate tax at that time
was that there must be a transmission of something at death from the
decedent to the living,'2 a concept which sprang from the decision in
Knowlton v. Moore.'" The Supreme Court there indicated that such a
transmission was necessary in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition
against unapportioned direct taxes upon property and to comply with the
due process clause. This position has since been abandoned in favor of
one which gives Congress more leeway in developing an estate tax pro-
gram. Congress may now classify gifts and provide for higher rates of
taxation upon some than upon others provided such classification is reason-
6. See, e. g., Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp.
565 (Ct. CI., xg4s) ; Estate of Benjamin L. Allen, 3 T. C. 844 (1944).
7. 281 U. S. 238 (1930).
8. In Ray, The Estate Tax on Transfers Intended to Take Enffect i Possession or
Enjoyment at or After Death (1941) 29 Gmo. L. J. 943, 947, it is pointed out that the
Court read the word "interest!' in the statute as "title" to arive at its conclusion.
9. McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (ig3i) ; Morsman v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 783
(ig3i) ; Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (193I).
1o. 46 STAT. i516. The Resolution was later perfected by § 8o3 (a) of the Rev-
enue Act of 1932, 47 STAT. 279.
II. 303 U. S. 303 (938).
12. For a discussion of this concept see Ray, supra note 8 at 944-958. It is inter-
esting to note that the same Court which decided May v. Heiner could at the same
term uphold (in Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497 (i93O)) the constitutionality of
the inclusion in the gross estate of the decedent of property to the extent of the interest
therein held as tenants by the entirey by the decedent and any other person, where no
part of the property originally belonged to such other person. Later on in United
States v. Jacobs, 3o6 U. S. 363 (1939) the Court upheld the- inclusion in the gross
estate of property held as joint tenants by the decedent and any other person.
13. 178 U. S. 41 (goo).
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able. 14  Moreover, in May v. Heiner the Court in searching for some-
thing which was transmitted from the dead to the living looked only at
those benefits which accrued to the remaindermen when the trust was cre-
ated and overlooked the added advantages which they received upon the
death of the settlor. Helvering v. Hallock 15 certainly indicated that the
Court has now awakened to the effect of these added advantages."8
The most that can be said for May v. Heiner at this time is that it
would be unfair to those who have retained life interests in reliance upon
it to destroy the immunity which it had promised.' 7 This of course as-
sumes that the settlor would have relinquished his life interest if that
case had been decided in favor of the government (which is doubtful) and
that someone is being injured by this reliance (which is unlikely) since
the settlor is now dead, and the remainderman can hardly be said to have
relied or to be injured.'" Nevertheless, both the courts and the Treasury
seem content to follow May v. Heiner for the present at least. 9
However, no matter what may be said for nontaxability where the
settlor retains no more than a life estate, it now seems clear that the re-
tention of such an estate is of tax significance when he also retains some
reversionary interest.'0 The path by which the Court has reached this
conclusion is not easy to follow, but an attempt will be made to retrace it.
14. Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297 (1938), which upheld the constitutionality
of the Joint Resolution of Mar. 3, 1931, and Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust
Co., 296 U. S. 85 (,935).
15. 309 U. S. io6 (i94o).
16. Cf. Whitney v. State Tax Commission of New York, 309 U. S. 530 (1940).
17. This is at least the suggestion contained in Alexander, Possibilities of Reacqui-
sition and the Federal Estate Tax (1946) 1 TAX L. RE. 291.
18. See I PAUL, op. cit. supra note 3, at § 7.15. See also Judge Frank dissenting
in Helvering v. Proctor, 14o F. (2d) 87, 89 (C. C. A. 2d, I944), and Commissioner v.
Hall's Estate, 153 F. (2d) 172, 174 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946). Judge Frank would have the
doctrine of stare decisis operate by way of estoppel, if at all; in the former case he sug-
gested that the burden of proving reliance upon May v. Heiner should be on the tax-
payer; in the latter case, he changed his mind and would place the burden of proving
no reliance upon the Commissioner.
io. The Tax Court was the first to be presented with the question of whether
May v. Heiner survived the Hallock case. In Estate of Mary H. Hughes, 44 B. T. A.
1196 (1941), and again in Estate of Harry A. Worcester, 47 B. T. A. 1o9 (942), it
answered in the negative. But in Estate of Edward E. Bradley, i T. C. 5I8 (1943),
aff'd. sub nom. Helvering v. Washington Trust Co., 14o F. (2d) 87 (C. C. A. 2d,
1944) the Tax Court recanted. The Circuit and District Courts have been unanimous
in refusing to hold that the Hallock case impliedly overruled May v. Heiner. See.
e. g., Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 153 F. (2d) 172 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) ; United
States v. Brown, 134 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943) ; Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119
F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941) ; New York Trust Co. v. United States, 5S F. Supp.
733 (Ct. Cl.. 1943): Brewer v. Hassett, 49 F. Supp. 501 (D. C. D. Mass., 1943).
The Second Circuit at least has not always been so hesitant. In Chase National
Bank v. United States, 116 F. (2d) 625 (C. C. A. 2d, I94O), a case involving the ap-
plicability of INT. REv. CODE § 81i (g), the court held that the Hallock case had im-
pliedly overruled. Bingham v. United States, 296 U. S. 211 (1935). The First Cir-
cuit followed this lead in Bodell v. Commissioner, 1.8 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. Ist,
I94.3). U. S. Treas. Reg. io5, § 81.17, as amended by T. D. 5512 of May I, 1946, sets
forth the Treasury's acquiescence in May v. Heiner.
2o. Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. (Stinson's Estate) v. Rothensies, 324 U. S. 1o8
(1945). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Field, 324 U. S. 1r3 (Q45) ; Eldredge v.
Rothensies, I5O F. (2d) 23 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S. 772 (945) ;
Mullikan v. Magruder, 149 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 4th, I4.q) ; Estate of Florence A.
Gibb, 6 T. C. No. 137, Docket No. 6947 (1946) : Estate of Charles Curie, 4 T. C. 1175
(1945) ; Estate of Peter D. Middlekauff, 2 T. C. (1943).
Retention of a Reversionary Interest
For a concept which was supposedly laid at rest in Helvering v. St.
Louis Union Trust Co.,21 the "possibility of reverter" as an incidence of
taxation now has a surprising vitality. The reverter may either be con-
ditioned upon survivorship of the settlor or it may not; it may be expressed
or it may arise by implication of law.
If a settlor transfers property in trust to pay the income to A for
life, and if A predecease the settlor, then over to the settlor; but if A
shall survive the settlor, then to A in fee simple, the settlor's reverter is
conditioned upon survivorship since A will not take the remainder in
fee simple as long as the settlor is alive. In Klein v. United States,22 the
Supreme Court held that this was a transfer intended to take effect in
"possession or enjoyment" at or after death. This marked the govern-
ment's first victory on this point. But the Treasury's advantage
was short-lived because when substantially similar transfers came be-
fore the Court in the St. Louis Trust Co. cases, 28 taxability was denied.
The Court distinguished the Klein case on the grounds that there the
remainder interest was contingent, while in the latter cases the remainder
interests were vested subject to being divested. The Court had once again
looked to the interests created at the time the trust came into existence
rather than to the additional benefits which would be obtained only at or
after the decedent's death. It is true that immediate enjoyment did not
pass from the decedent to the remaindermen at death in the St. Louis Trust
cases as they had in May v. Heiner; but such enjoyment could not be ob-
tained by the remaindermen until.after the settlor's death because of the
express provisions of the trust. Viewed objectively, therefore, there could
be no question about the settlor's intent.24  The statute would appear to be
admirably suited to reach such a transfer. The Court, however, was un-
doubtedly still bothered by its constitutional fears and also by its previous
decision in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co.25 which held in effect that the
statute did not apply where immediate enjoyment of the trust corpus did
not pass from the decedent at his death.
21. 296 U. S. 39 (935). Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Suther-
land had said: "His death simply put an end to what, at best, was a mere possibility
of reverter by extinguishing it-that is to say, by converting what was merely possible
into an utter impossibility."
22. 283 U. S. 231 (i93i).
23. Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (935), and Becker v.
St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (935). The trust in the former case pro-
vided for income to A for life with remainders over to certain named persons. But if A
predeceased the settlor, the corpus was to be paid over to the settlor. The trustee was
also given a discretionary power to terminate the trust whereupon the corpus would
be returned to the settlor. The Court paid no attention to the effect of this power.
In the latter case, the trust provided for the payment of $3oo per month to A for
life. If A should die before the settlor, the corpus should revert to the settlor; if the
settlor died first, then the corpus would be given to A immediately.
24. The Courts have not been very articulate about the element of intent which
the statute makes a part of the test. The few cases which have expresslir tried to
work out some theory of intent have adopted a subjective standard. Cf. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 505 (Ct Cl., I945), and see
Francis Biddle Trust, 3 T. C. 832, 842-844 (1944) (concurring opinion) both of which
denied taxability, and Estate of William Walker, 4 T. C. 390 (I944), which imposed
taxability. See also Surrey and Aronson, Inter Vivos Transers and the Federal Es-
tate Tax (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 1332, 1337-1340, and text supported by notes 56-60
infra.
25. 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
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Notions of "title" and distinctions between contingent and vested re-
mainders are both untenable and impractical as solutions of a tax problem,
and a revamped Court did away with them when the opportunity presented
itself in Helvering v. Hallock,'26 a case involving the same type of "possi-
bility of reverter" as the Klein and the St. Louis Trust Co. cases, i. e. a
reverter based upon survivorship. Nothing is to be gained by repeating the
time worn queries about the effect of the Hallock case on May v. Heiner,
2
the problems raised by it on the valuation question. 28 and its "inescanable
rationale"; 29 suffice it to say for the time being that it definitely placed
reverters conditioned upon survivorship within the ambit of § 811 (c).
Whether the Stinson case 30 did any more than reaffirm the Hallock
decision as applied to a new type of situation has caused much speculation..
In the Stinson case the Court was confronted with a trust in which there
was L life estate in the setflor, with succeeding life estates in her two
daughters; at the death of each daughter the corpus supporting her share
of the income was to be paid to her descendants. If either daughter died
without leaving surviving descendants, the corpus supporting her share
was to be added to the share of the other daughter; if both died without
surviving descendants, the corpus was to be paid to such persons as the
settlor might appoint by will. The settlor died, having exercised her power
of appointment and leaving two unmarried daughters, who subsequently
married and had children. The question on review was limited to valua-
tion,91 and the Court held that the entire corpus of the trust at the date
of the settlor's death should be included in her gross estate.
The first point to be noted is that the settlor retained a life estate and
therefore the remaindermen-both the daughters and their descendants-
would have to survive her to take in "possession or enjoyment." In addi-
tion the settlor had a contingent power of appointment, i. e. dependent
upon the death of the daughters without surviving issue. From this angle,
the Court in imposing taxability was merely limiting May v. Heiner to its
exact facts-a course of action about which there could be little complaint. 1'
26. 3o9 U. S. io6 (I94O). The Hallock case involved three trust arrangements.
The first was a separation agreement which provided for income to settlor's wife for
life, and upon her death the corpus was to be paid to the settlor if he was then living;
if the settlor was dead, the corpus was to be paid to his son and daughter. The sec-
ond trust was an ante-nuptial agreement. Income was to be paid to settlor's wife
for life; if she died during settlor's lifetime, the corpus was to be paid over to the
settlor. If the wife survived the settlor. the corpus was to go to the wife. In the
third trust, income was to be paid to settlor's wife for life, and upon her death to the
settlor if he should survive the wife. Upon the death of the survivor of the wife and
settlor the corpus was to be paid to the executors or administrators of the settlor. A
comparison of these trusts with those involved in the Klein and St. Louis Trust Co.
cases will reveal how confusing and unrealistic would be a test based upon a considera-
tion of whether the remainders were contingent or vested subject to being divested.
27. See Comment (194o) 49 YALE L. J. 1118.
28. PAUL, op. cit supra note 3.
29. See Eisenstein, The Hallock Problem; A Case Study in Administration
(1945) 58 HARv. L. REv. 1141-1143, 1157-1159.
3o. Fidelity-Phila. Trust Co. (Stinson's Estate) v. Rothensies, 324 U. S. io8
(1945). Accord, Commissioner v. Estate of Field, 324 U. S. 113 (945). The latter
case was a companion of the former and went off on the authority of the former: it
adds little to the Stinson case and so will not be given separate treatment
31. The limitation of the review to the question of valuation as distinct from a
taxing principle was novel. Ordinarily one thinks of the former as being dependent
upon the latter, i. e., if the transaction does not come within some taxing principle there
can be no valuation. But having thus limited the scope of its review, the Court pro-
ceeded to define the taxing principle involved.
3ia. See PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION (Supp., 1946) 198-2oo.
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However, the power of appointment was not conditioned upon the sur-
vivorship of the settlor but upon the death of second life tenants without
issue.32 Viewed in this light the Court was attaching a tax merely because
a reverter had been retained-a reverter not depending upon survivorship.
It is this aspect of the case which has caused so much trouble.83 If this
is the correct interpretation of the decision then Lloyd's Estate 4 which
was the leading case in support of the proposition that a reverter not con-
ditioned upon survivorship would not lead to taxability, goes by the boards.
However, the taxpayer may derive some consolation from the fact that the
Treasury has indicated it will not press the decision to this limit.8 5
The Stinson case again raised the question about the vitality of May
v. Heiner. The Court stressed the fact that because of the life estate in
the settlor the remaindermen could not take in "possession or enjoy-
ment" until at or after his death. Since May v. Heiner rejected this idea,
it is difficult to distinguish it from the Stinson case.8 6 Moreover, it may
be argued that if retention of a life estate is insufficient to bring about
taxability, the addition of reverter should be no more powerful.8 7 But the
case did pretty definitely clear up the problem created by several Tax
Court decisions to the effect that a tax would not be imposed where the
value of the "possibility of reverter" is negligible because too remote or
too difficult to compute because of unpredictable circumstances such as
32. See Goldstein v. United States, 325 U. S. 687, 693, n. 3 (1945) : "Thus in [the
Stinson case] the decedent's power of appointment was exercisable only if her two
daughters died before her and left no surviving descendants. If the daughters died
first but left surviving descendants, it would be certain before decedent's death that her
power of appointment would be nugatory. But such a contingency did not happen.....
But the Court had stated in the Stinson case: "The remainder interests of the de-
scendants of the daughters were contingent upon their surviving both the decedent and
the daughters and took effect in possession only after the death of the decedent" 324
U. S. at II.
33. There is language in the case to support the contention that the Court was up-
holding taxation where a "possibility of reverter" not conditioned upon survivorship
is retained: "It is enough if he retains some contingent interest in the property until
his death or thereafter, delaying until then the ripening of full dominion over the prop-
erty by the beneficiaries. The value of the property subject to the contingency, rather
than the actual or theoretical value of the possibility of the occurrence of the contin-
gency, is the measure of the tax." 324 U. S. at 112.
34. 141 F. (2d) 758 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1944). There the trust was to pay income to
the settlors's son for life with a general power of appointment in the son to dispose of
corpus by will. If the son failed to exercise the power of appointment, the corpus was
to be paid to the son's wife and descendants according to the intestacy laws. If the son
was survived by neither a wife nor descendants, the corpus was to be paid to the
settlor or his legal representatives. It may well be that the existence of the power of
appointment in the son subconsciously influenced the court's decision in this case. In
Eldredge v. Rothensies, I5o F. (2d) 23, 24 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1945), cert. denied, 326 U. S.
772 (1945), the Third Circuit Court expressed doubts that its decision in Lloyd's
Estate had withstood the Stinson case. Some other cases reaching the same result as
that in Lloyd's Estate, though not always on the ground that the reverter was not con-
ditioned upon survivorship are: Post v. United States, 6i F. Supp. 38o (E. D. N. Y.
1945) ; Philbrick v. Manning, 57 F. Supp. 245 (D. N. J. i944); Estate of Harris
Fahnestock, 4 T. C. io96 (x934) ; Estate of Mary B. Hunnewell, 4 T. C. 1128 (3945);
Estate of Ellen P. C. Goodyear, 2 T. C. 885 (i943).
35. U. S. Treas. Reg. io5, § 8m7, as amended by T. D. 5512 of May I, 1946. But
it should be noted that the value of a reverter not conditioned upon survivorship would
be included in decedent's gross estate under Internal Revenue Code § 8ii (a) as an
interest held by the decedent at his death. Estate of S. H. Henry, 4 T. C. 423 (i944).
However, in most cases the value of such a reverter will be negligible.
36. For this reason Justice Douglas refused to acquiesce in the majority's opinion
and concurred in the result only. 324 U. S. at 112.
37. However at least one commentator thinks that in some cases the difference
between retention of only a life estate and retention of a life estate plus a reverter
would be substantial. Eisenstein, supra note 29, at II7o, 1171.
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future marriage or the leaving of issue.3 8 The Supreme Court emphasized
that it is not the value of the reverter but the value of the interest subject
to the reverter which is important, and hence remoteness or uncertainty of
the reverter is immaterial3 9
Another problem to be considered with respect to retention of a re-
verter interest is the effect of a reverter arising by operation of law. If a
settlor were to create a trust with income for life to A and remainder to
B if he be living at A's death, the death of B while A is living would
result in a return of the corpus to the settlor or to his estate upon A's
death just as effectively as if the settlor had expressly so provided. 40
Assuming that the express retention of a reverter would result in taxation
of such a trust, there seems little justification for denying taxation simply
because the reverter arises by operation of law.41 The Treasury has always
insisted that this distinction should bring about no difference in result,
4 2
and the Supreme Court has avoided the question by denying certiorari
38. It should be mentioned here that the Tax Court has been able to render very
little help to the Supreme Court by way of "expert administrative knowledge" of the
problem. (See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 489 (1943)). The Tax Court has
successively adopted tests based upon the remoteress of the reverter whether condi-
tioned upon survivorship or not: Estate of Ellen P. C. Goodyear, 2 T. C. 885 (1943) ;
Estate of Charles Delaney, I T. C. 781 (1943) ; upon the subjective intent of the settlor
as gathered from the terms of the trust and surrounding circumstances: Estate of Mary
B. Hunnewell, 4 T. C. 1128 (1945) ; Estate of Benjamin Allen, 3 T. C. 844 (1944) ;
see Frances Biddle Trust, 3 T. C. 832, 842-844 (I944) (Concurring opinion) ; upon
whether the reverter was conditioned on survivorship: Estate of Harris Falmestock,
4 T. C. 1o96 (1945) ; and finally upon a reverter regardless of survivorship: Estate of
Arthur Sinclair, 6 T. C. No. 136, Docket No. 3667 (1946). In the Sinclair case the
court felt that the Stinson case required taxability even though the reverter was not
conditioned upon survivorship.
39. See note 33 supra.
40. RESTATEMENT, TRUSTS (1935) § 411. Whether or not there is a reverter by
operation of law will of course depend upon state law. See PAUL, SELECTrD STUDIES
IN FEDERAL. TAXATioN (2nd series, 1938) 1-52.
41. But the courts have not been in agreement upon the question. In the follow-
ing cases a reverter by operation of law was held to be sufficient to sustain taxation:
Commissioner v. Bank of California, i55 F. (2d) I (C. C. A. 9th, 1946), cert. denied,
15 U. S. L. WEEK 3147, No. 267 (1946) ; Commissioner v. Bayne's Estate, 155 F. (2d)
475 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) ; Estate of Bertha Low, 2 T. C. 1114 (1943). In the following
cases a reverter by operation of law was held to be not enough to support taxation
when such reverter was too remote: Fifth Ave. Bank of N. Y. v. Nunan, 59 F. Supp.
753 (E. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Central Hanover Bank -& Trust Co. v. United States, 58 F.
Supp. 565 (Ct. Cl., i945) ; Estate of Ellen P. C. Goodyear, 2 T. C. 885 (1943) ; Estate
of Lester Hofhehner, 2 T. C. 773 (1945). In the following case it was held that the
reverter must be expressly retained in order to occasion taxation: Estate of Joseph K.
Cass, 3 T. C. 562 (1945). In the following case the court paid no attention to the re-
verter by operation of law, but denied taxation upon the authority of May v. Heiner:
United States v. Brown, 134 F. (2d) 372 (C. C. A. 9th, I943).
42. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, as amended by T. D. 5512 of May I, 1946.
Should the doctrine of "worthier title," i. e., the attempt to create a remainder in
those who would take the same interest by descent is void and results in a reversion in
the settlor, be utilized to sustain taxation upon the grounds of a reverter by operation
of law? The doctrine has its roots in the feudal system of dues and service and is
today merely a rule of construction. RESTATEmENT, PROPERTY (1940) §314. The
Treasury has indicated that it will not take advantage of the doctrine. U. S. Treas.
Reg. los, § 81.17, Example 6. In Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 153 F. (2d) 172 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1946), and Commissioner v. Kellogg, 119 F. (2d) 54 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1941)
the doctrine was rejected. Apparently the courts feel that since the "subtle casuistries"
of the property law cannot defeat taxation (see note 4 supra), they should not aid it.
But cf. Estate of Bertha Low, 2 T. C. "114 (1943), and see (1945) 45 COL. L. REv.
467, 471.
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in Commissioner v. Bank of California 43 which upheld the Treasury's
position.
Power in Beneficiary to Acquire Trust Property by Altering or Terminating
the Trust
In Goldstone v. United States 44 the decedent at an advanced age pur-
chased two insurance contracts. One, obtained by the payment of a single
premium, was a life insurance policy payable upon his death to his wife,
or if she predeceased him to their daughter; if both beneficiaries prede-
ceased the decedent the proceeds were payable to his executor or adminis-
trat6r. The other contract was a single premium annuity contract which
decedent was required to buy in order to obtain the insurance policy with-
out a physical examination . 4  Under the annuity contract the decedent
was to receive certain payments for his life and upon his death a lump sum
payment was to be made upon the same terms as applied to the distribution
of the proceeds of the life insurance policy. Decedent's wife was designated
as "owner" of the contracts, and she had the unrestricted power to assign
them, borrow on them, change the beneficiary, and surrender them for their
surrender value. At decedent's death the wife had not exercised this power.
The Court held that the proceeds of the contract were taxable as part of
the decedent's gross estate.
Aside from the power which the wife possessed, this case is similar to
the Stinson case, and the result was inevitable . 4  But Justice Roberts, who
43. 155 F. (2d) i (C. C. A. 9th, 1946), cert. denied, 15 U. S. L. WEEK 3147, No. 267
(1946). Finally there is a question of whether the retention of a reversionary interest
by the settlor in a trust created prior to the effective date of the first estate tax law will
render such a trust taxable. The Second Circuit has answered the question in the
affirmative. Commissioner v. Flanders, iii F. (2d) 118 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940), and
Pratt v. Commissioner, i56 F. (!d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946), cert. denied, 15 U. S. L.
WEEK 317z, Docket No. 523 (I946) but cf. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927),
and Lewellyn v. Frick, 268 U. S. 238 (1925).
44. 325 U. S. 687 (1945) as amended.
45. The Court had previously held in Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U. S. 531 (194i)
that the combination of an insurance policy and an annuity contract was not an insur-
ance risk and hence not taxable under INT. REV. CODE § 81i (g), which covers taxa-
tion of the proceeds of life insurance policies received by beneficiaries other than the
decedent's estate. At the time of the Goldstone case this was important since a $4o,ooo
exemption was allowed upon the proceeds of such life policies. § 404 (a) of the Rev-
enue Act of 1942, 56 STAT. 944, removed this exemption, so it is immaterial now
whether the transaction is taxed as a transfer intended to take effect at or after death or
as insurance. It should be noted that an insurance transaction which is not taxable un-
der § 811 (g), as amended, because the insured has not paid the premiums himself and has
not retained any of the indicia of ownership will nevertheless be taxable under § 811 (c)
if in transferring such indicia of ownership, the insured retained a possibility of re-
verter conditioned on survivorship. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.25.
46. The Goldstone case was not without its own overtones upon the possibility of
taxation because of retention of a reverter not conditioned on survivorship. The Court
stated: "Section 302 (c), . . ., reaches all inter vivos transfers which may be re-
sorted to, as a substitute for a will, in making dispositions of property operative at
death. It thus sweeps into the gross estate all property the ultimate possession or en-
joyment of which is held in suspense until the moment of the decedents death or there-
after [citing Stinson case]." 325 U. S. at 69o. Moreover, the Court originally stated
in the opinion that the decision was inconsistent with that in Lloyd's Estate, and in
harmony with that in Bailey v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 778 (Ct. Cf., 1940). (The
Bailey case has held that proceeds of a life insurance policy for which decedent had not
paid the premiums, and in which he had retained no indicia of ownership, should be in-
cluded in his gross estate because he had retained a "possibility of reverter.") But one
week later the Court modified its opinion to state that it had no occasion to determine
whether its decision necessarily controlled the "factual situation" presented in Lloyd's
Estate. 325 U. S. at 69o, n..
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wrote a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice Douglas, felt that the
existence of the power in the wife was inconsistent with a holding that the
decedent retained any interest; that to include such a transfer in the de-
cedent's gross estate would also require inclusion in his estate of property
which he had transferred to his wife in fee because there was a chance
that it would revert to him if the wife died intestate.47  The majority on
the other hand decided that it was not necessary that decedent's retained
interest be indefeasible and completely ignored the reductio ad absurdum
of the dissent.4  It should be noted, however, that the wife by exercising
her power to borrow, assign, or surrender would realize something less
than she would by refraining from such exercise and taking the proceeds of
the contracts on decedent's death. But by exercising her power to change
the beneficiary and her power to surrender she could completely eliminate
the decedent's life estate and his reversionary interest.
The Treasury has indicated that it will not take advantage of the
holding of the Goldstone case on the effect of an outstanding power to
alter or terminate. Thus if a transfer is otherwise taxable, the existence
of such a power in a person living at the transferor's death will remove the
transfer from the confines of § 8I I (c). However, if the person possessing
the power should die prior to the transferor's death, having failed to exer-
cise the power, then § 811 (c) will be applied.4
When No Interest Is Retained by the Settlor 50
If a trust is created giving the income to A for the life of the settlor
with remainders over upon the settlor's death and no reversionary interest
is retained, the settlor has effectively disposed of all his interest in the prop-
47. Id. at 694, 695.
48. The reductio ad absurdum, of course, ignores the fact that taxation is a prac-
tical matter, and that there is nothing inherently wrong in saying that to avoid estate
taxes a person should dispose of his property absolutely. It is precisely the attaching
of "strings" which the tax laws are designed to attack. It is only our pre-conceived no-
tions of what a "death" tax, a "gift" tax or an "income" tax must be which prevent
realization of this. Once these notions are dispelled the way is left open to reach a
decision on practical grounds in the light of prevailing conditions.
49. U. S. Treas. Reg. Io5, § 81.17. But if the power "is deemed to be unreal" it will
be disregarded. A somewhat analogous situation arises when a power is given to the
trustee to return part of the corpus to the settlor during his lifetime. If the trustee may
exercise this power in his "untrammelled discretion," then § 811 (c) has been held not to
apply. Commissioner v. Irving Trust Co., 147 F. (2d) 946 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945). How-
ever, if the trustee's discretion is limited, and he may be forced to act under certain
circumstances, then to the extent of the limitation the transfer will be caught up by
§ 811 (c). Blunt v. Kelly, 131 F. (2d) 632 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1942) (Trustee could return
to settlor parts of the corpus if he deemed the use of such funds necessary to the proper
care and support of the settlor) ; Banker's Trust Co. v. Higgins, 136 F. (2d) 477 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1943) (Trustee could invade corpus to provide a fixed minimum life income
to settlor). It is an interesting speculation whether this distinction survives the Gold-
stone case. In the latter case the transferor could be deprived of his interest only if
someone acted affirmatively; where the trustee may in his absolute discretion return
part of the corpus to the settlor, the settlor can reacquire an interest only if someone
else acts affirmatively. Query, whether this difference is substantial enough to serve
as a dividing line between taxability and non-taxability?
5o. Much of what is contained in this section is merely speculation influenced by
the pattern of recent cases. It may be objected that to stretch the limits of taxation to
the lengths herein indicated would be unsound and undesirable; whether or not this is
so is not the problem of this note. But such an objection should not be permitted to
hide the possibilities inherent in a tax statute drawn as broadly as § 811 (c) and in
the present constitutional position of the Supreme Court.
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erty.5 ' Yet it is evident that immediate enjoyment cannot be obtained by
the remaindermen until the death of the settlor. Nevertheless in Reinecke
v. Northern Trust Co.52 it was held that such a transfer could not be sub-
jected to taxation because nothing was transmitted from settlor at his
death. What would be the fate of such a trust today? 521 It has already
been noted that this concept of an estate tax has lost its vitality and that
the spectre of unconstitutionality which gave rise to it no longer makes
courts uneasy.53  Moreover, the settlor has expressly made his death the
event which will terminate the advantage received by one of the beneficiaries
and ripen the full dominion over the property of the others. That this
was the intended effect of the transaction cannot be gainsaid. The transfer
does not have exactly the same effect as making a will, since a testator
can change his mind and alter the disposition of his property at any time
until his death, while the settlor of an inter vivos trust who retains no power
to alter, amend or revoke has lost this control of the trust res. But should
this loss, self-inflicted for anyone of a variety of reasons, be the occasion
for denying estate tax liability when the settlor has just as effectively di-
rected the disposition of his property after his death as if he had done so
by will? "4
A more difficult situation is presented when a settlor at a rather ad-
vanced age, say 6o, creates a trust providing for the payment of income
to A for 30 years with remainders over in the corpus and retains no re-
51. It may be doubted that a person could ever "effectively" dispose of all his in-
terest in property, since nearly all of these trusts are family arrangements, and there
is always the chance that the intestate death of one of the donees will result in the
return of the property to the donor under the intestacy laws. But "effectively" is a
relative term and need .not mean that the donor must negative each and every possi-
bility that the property will revert to him. See note 48 supra. ,
52. 278 U. S. 339 (I929). The settlor also reserved a power to alter, change, or
modify, to be exercised in conjunction with the beneficiary. Such a power would today
bring about taxation under INT. REv. CODE § 81i (d). Helvering v. City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (i935).
52a. Trusts in which the settlor retains no interest may also run into tax difficul-
ties from the concepts of family solidarity and vicarious enjoyment of income received
by others which have been developed by the Supreme Court in Lusthaus v. Commis-
sioner, 66 Sup. Ct. 539 (1946); Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (940) ; Helvering
v. Fuller, 310 U. S. 69 (1940); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U. S. 331 (940) ; Helvering
v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85 (935); and Douglas v. Willcut, 26
U. S. i (935). Since the trust is essentially an instrument for making family fiscal
arrangements, the settlor may be considered as deriving "enjoyment" from that which
is received by the trust beneficiaries where it is in discharge of some familial obliga-
tion such as support, maintenance, or education. The inference of "enjoyment!' be-
comes even stronger when the settlor himself is a trustee with wide discretionary
powers with regard to investment, disposal, and retention of the trust corpus. In such
a case the trust would be reached by that part of § 8ii (c) which taxes trusts in which
the settlor has retained for life "the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to income
from, the property." See-U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.18.
53. See text supported by notes 12 to 14, supra.
54. Cf. Colonial Trust Co. v. Kraemer, 63 F. Supp. 866 (D. C. D. Conn. 1945);
but cf. Wishard v. United States, 143 F. (2d) 704 (C. C. A. 7th, i944) ; Commis-
sioner v. Lasker's Estate, 141 F. (2d) 889 (C. C. A. 7th, 1944) ; Estate of I. H. Bur-
ney, 4 T. C. 449 ('944) ; Estate of William A. Taylor, 2 T. C. 634 (943) ; Estate of
Edward L. Ballard, 47 B. T. A. 784 (1942), affd. per curian, 138 F. (2d) 512 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1943). All of these cases involved Reinecke type trusts, and the Court refused
to uphold their taxation. And see the Stinson case, wherein the Reinecke decision is
cited as a subsisting precedent. 324 U. S. at III. But in his dissenting opinion in the
Hallock case, Justice Roberts thought that Hallock demolished the Reinecke case. 309
U. S. 123. It should be mentioned here that if the settlor retains a reversionary interest
in a Reinecke type trust, the Stinson case apparently requires that the corpus if the
trust be taxed to the settlor. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, as amended by T. D. 5512
of May 1, 1946, Example 7.
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versionary interest. In Shukert v. Allen,"5 it was held that such a trans-
fer was not reached by § 81i (c). But it is reasonably certain-as certain
as we can possibly be about such matters-that a settlor at the age of sixty
will not survive the thirty years term of the income beneficiary, and it is
equally definite that he must have realized this.56 Once this fact is grasped
the trust assumes all of the characteristics of the Reinecke type trust. The
intent of the settlor becomes a little less clear because of the danger in-
herent in applying the statistics of the life expectancy tables to individual
cases. But intent is usually a poor tool with which to attack any problem-
especially one involving taxation. And it is in the field of "tax law" that
the courts have been most busily engaged in developing a highly objective
and practical theory of intent.51 But in extending § 811 (c) to cover a
Shukert v. Allen type .trust two difficulties would be encountered: (i) the
administrative task thus created would be extremely burdensome; and (2)
the question of whether Congress intended to tax such transfers.
' Every trust would have to be examined alongside the life expectancy
tables. Special circumstances of each case which would make the tables
inapplicable would have to be taken into consideration. If the income bene-
ficiary had a life expectancy less than that of the settlor, or in case his* term
is for years, if that term were less than the life expectancy of the settlor,
then an evaluation of the remainder interests would have to be made, since
logically any remainder which would not take effect in "possession or en-
joyment" until at or after death of the settlor should be included in his
gross estate. Some policy would have to be adopted to cover cases where
contrary to expectation the settlor outlives the beneficiaries. From the
taxpayer's standpoint his fiscal affairs would take on a high degree of
uncertainty. He could not very successfully plan the disposition of his
property so as to give the objects of his beneficence the maximum monetary
advantages, for he could never be too sure that taxes would not interfere
with his desires.58 For these reasons the Treasury would not be too likely
to press for such an extension. These difficulties may also furnish an
explanation for the imposition of taxation where a reverter not condi-
tioned upon survivorship is retained-if that is what the Supreme Court
was actually doing in the Stinson case. 5  In other words it may well be
55. 273 U. S. 545 (1927).
56. Cf. Judge Frank's analysis of the "certainty" involved in evaluating a con-
tingent remainder for gift tax purposes. Commissioner v. Marshall, 125 F. (2d) 943,
946, 947 (C. C. A. 2d, I942).
57. There is an extended discussion of intent and the treatment given to it by the
Courts in tax cases in PAUL, SELEcTm STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION (2nd series,
1938) 271-3o4.
58. Just how much assurance the taxpayer is entitled to is an interesting problem.
There will be no attempt here to moralize about the equities or inequities of tax avoid-
ance. But it has been suggested that the taxpayer is accorded adequate treatment
when he is informed that a tax will be levied upon him based on the income which he
received, and hence he runs risk that his plans to avoid this tax will be upset. This
suggestion applies equally well to avoidance of an estate tax. See Pavenstedt, The
Broadened Scope of Section 22 (a): The Evolution of the Clifford Doctrine (ig4i)
51 YALE L. J. 213, 217-219.
59. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has apparently reached this conclusion.
In Dominick's Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F. (2d) 843 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946) the trust
provided for the payment of income to the settlor's son until he reached 25, at which
time he was to receive the corpus. If the son died before attaining the age of 25, the
corpus was to be paid over to the settlor or his wife or the survivor of them; but if
both were dead the property was to go to such persons as the son should appoint by
will or his intestate successors. The Court held that the value of the corpus less the
value of the son's term for years was taxable. Accord, Estate of Arthur Sinclair, 6
that the Court was in effect saying that the existence of such a reverter-
whether ii is express or implied by law-is a sufficiently definite and easy
way to determine the presence of an intent to postpone "possession or
enjoyment" until at or after death.60 It might be argued that since such
reverters are generally remote and of little monetary value, they should
not be the cause of taxation where the transfer is otherwise the same as a
tax-free transfer, i. e. one in which the settlor retains no interest and does
not expressly make his death the turning point in the ripening of suc-
cessive benefits. But such an argument misses the point; for it is not the
reverter which determines taxation; the character of the transfer does that,
and the reverter is a limitation upon taxation to meet practical difficulties.
However, even with constitutional difficulties removed, does the taxa-
tion of transfers with no interest retained, or with a reverter not condil-
tioned upon -survivorship retained, which do not expressly make the set-
tlor's death a factor come within what Congress intended in passing § 8I I
(c) ? 61 That part of § 811 (c) which is now under consideration has cer-
tainly not been framed with a view to being specific; this becomes apparent
when subsection (b), (d), (e), (f) and (g) of § 8II are inspected.
62
Moreover, these latter subsections deal with situations in which the de-
cedent maintains until his death some control or power to control the prop-
erty which they tax. Subsection (c) on the other hand combines trans-
fers made in contemplation of death, which need not contain the element
of retained control, with transfers intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after death; thus these provisions may be looked upon as
complementary; the former attacking outright transfers of property "in
fee simple" in anticipation of death, and the latter seeking out transfers
which control the devolution of property after death-both types of transfers
being made with an eye to avoiding taxation. In this light, it can be seen
that the Reinecke case, Shukert v. Allen, and trusts containing reverters
not conditioned upon survivorship could be taxed as transfers taking affect
at or after death, leaving only the administrative difficulties already con-
sidered
-.63
T, C. No. 136, Docket No. 3667 (946). For the time being the Treasury will not
take advantage of the decision in Dominick's Estate. U. S. Treas. Reg. iO5, § 81.17,
as amended by T. D. 5512, Example 4.
6o. Cf. statement from Goldstone case, quoted in note 46 supra, and the following
from Dominick's Estate v. Commissioner, 152 F. (2d) 843, 844 (C. C. A. 2, 1946):
"[Under the Hallock case] § 81i (c) reaches all inter vivos transfers which may be
utilized in preference to the making of a will in order to effectuate a disposition of prop-
erty which will be operative at leath."
6i. Here again the tool is not suited to the job. In framing tax legislation the
Congress must attempt to make its way between the danger of being so specific that the
administrative authorities are helpless in the face of new situations and the threat of
overgeneralization which may, through lack of administrative discretion or the impos-
sibility of its exercise, create an altogether confused situation. The courts in attempt-
ing to discover the legislative intent are to a great extent merely formulating a work-
ing hypothesis, tested perhaps by the temper of the times, the fiscal needs of the
Treasury, and the urge for taxpayer security, which will avoid the same pitfalls. Cf.
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAw (2nd ed. 1927) 170-:73.
62. § 8ii (b) reaches dower and curtesy interests of the surviving spouse; (d)
attacks retention of a power to alter, amend, revoke, or terminate retained by the de-
cedent either alone or in conjunction with any other person; (e) brings into the gross
estate property subject to a power of appointment held by the decedent; (f) encom-
passes joint and community property; and (g) taxes the proceeds of life insurance
policies upon the life of the decedent.
63. There has already been judicial recognition of the similarity between transfers
in contemplation of death and transfers intended to take effect at or after death in the
treatment accorded both for gift tax purposes. Both are taxed as completed gifts when
made and then are included in the donor's gross estate at his death. (There is of
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However, if the Klein, Hallock, Stinson and Goldstone cases are con-
sidered on the basis of the factual situations with which they dealt, and the
implications of their language are disregarded, they require taxation only
when a reversionary interest conditioned upon the survivorship of the set-
tlor is retained. It may be that the Supreme Court will go no farther,
in which case trusts in which no interest is retained by the settlor would
escape the embrace of § 811 (c).
Conclusion
It is true the cases reveal a lack of perfect symmetry. Although such
a deficiency may be unfortunate, new problems and change of perspective
naturally tend to throw established doctrines out of focus. The courts
could of course attempt to remedy this with one sweeping adjustment; but
courts do not normally adopt this procedure-their operations are more
gradual. At any rate the possibilities and implications are fairly plain
and far reaching; but the Treasury in T. D. 5512 has demonstrated an
admirable restraint in not exploiting them."
But since administrative forebearance cannof always be depended upon,
the settlor of an already existing trust who has retained a life interest, which
does not give him as much satisfaction as would the chance to escape the
estate tax, or a reverter, whether conditioned upon survivorship or not,
would do well to transfer it.6 5 The settlor about to create a trust should
retain neither. And both should keep their fingers crossed.
R.J.B.
course an estate tax credit to the extent that the property has been taxed as a gift;
but such credit will not in all cases make the taxpayer whole. INT. REV. CODE § 813.)
Cf. Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U. S. 176 (943), and Robinette v. Helvering, 318
U. S. 184 (1943) ; but cf. Rasquin v. Humphreys 308 U. S. 54 (939) ; Estate of San-
ford v. Commissioner, 308 U. S. 39 (1939); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U. S. 280
(1933).
64. It has been suggested that the only thing which was wrong with the applica-
tion of the Hallock doctrine was the manner in which the Treasury overworked it
prior to T. D. 5512 of May 1, 1946; but that T. D. 5512 in confining the doctrine to
reverters based upon survivorship has done much to remedy the situation. Eisenstein,
supra note 29, at 1178-1181; Eisenstein, Another Glance at the Hallock Problem (1946)
i TAx L. REV. 430, 432, n. 12.
65. The taxpayer might not escape even in this fashion. Since the transfer of the
reverter would be for the purpose of avoiding the state tax, it might be considered as
a transfer in contemplation of death under § 81I (c), which would leave the corpus
subject to taxation at the taxpayer's death. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98
F. (2d) 794 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938). But perhaps Allen v. Trust Co. of Georgia, 326
U. S. 63o (946) has removed this danger.
